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ABSTRACT
From 1999 to 2003, Taiwan faced a deflationary situation. The reasons for this deflation can be
attributed to both domestic and global factors. Domestic changes including local political unrest,
tensions with China, outbound investment to China, a weakened financial system, and a deteriorating
government  financial  situation,  provided  the  backdrop  for  the  economic  slowdown  and
corresponding deflation. A number of global factors, especially the bursting of the Internet and IT
bubbles in late 2000 and the rise of China’s economy, also heavily influenced both global and
Taiwanese prices. This paper adopts a simplified aggregate demand and aggregate supply model to
derive a deterministic equation of the GDP deflator (PGDP), and then applies quarterly data covering
the period from 1982 to 2003 to estimate the PGDP equation using 2SLS. The empirical results are
used to identify the sources of PGDP deflation in Taiwan. In addition, the phenomenon of price
divergence appears since 2002 where the WPI increased and the CPI decreased. The causes of the
WPI-CPI divergence are also investigated in this paper.
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I.  Foreword 
Ever since the Great Depression of the 1930s drew to a close, inflation has been 
one of major headaches for financial and economic decision-makers.  Inflation and 
the unemployment rate have been the two major elements that make up the misery 
index, while deflation has never seriously been considered a threat.    However, by the 
end of the 1990s, Japan, China, and Hong Kong had exhibited a phenomenon of price 
decreases for many years running, and the rate of price increases in both European 
and American countries had also started to slow down.  The issue of deflation 
therefore gradually drew the attention of economists and policy-makers.  The 
November 2002 issue of The Economist even went so far as to suggest that deflation 
had become a serious threat to the global economy. 
In Taiwan, the GDP deflator has decreased in four out of five years from 1999 to 
2003, the exception being 2001. The CPI also declined in each of the years from 2001 
to 2003.    In April 2003, Rogoff, an expert associated with the International Monetary 
Fund, published a research report in which Taiwan, together with Japan, Hong Kong, 
and Germany, were ranked as high-risk countries for deflation.  The core CPI, 
published by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of the 
Executive Yuan in Taiwan , exhibited negative growth in each quarter in 2003.  
These findings have made deflation a cause for concern among both scholars and the 
media.  Although the Central Bank of China in Taiwan has never admitted that 
Taiwan is suffering from a deflation problem, it has tried very hard to promote 
domestic economic activity and avoid price decreases. 
Several international research institutions have engaged in research on deflation; 
see, for instance Ahearne, et al. (2002) and Rogoff (2003).    The Bank of Japan (2001) 
also convened a symposium on the issue - “The Role of Monetary Policy under Low  4
Inflation: Deflation Shocks and Policy Responses” - in 2000, where participating 
scholars emphasized the importance of monetary policy in guarding against and 
dealing with deflation.
1 
In Taiwan, however, there have been no government reports on the domestic 
deflation issue, probably because the government has denied that the problem exists.  
Similarly, very few studies have been performed by domestic scholars.  Research 
reports compiled by the Department of Economic Research of the Central Bank of 
China (2002) and the Council for Economic Planning and Development of the 
Executive Yuan (2003) have merely tried to explain the causes of and responsive 
strategies to deflation in the light of the experiences of other countries.  Wu (2003), 
for instance, not only analyzed the reasons why the global price growth had slowed 
since 1997, but he also discussed the causes of low prices in Taiwan.    Huang (2003) 
probed long-term, medium-term, and short-term causes that led to the price decreases 
in Taiwan and provided policy recommendations.  However, although Wu and 
Huang talked about the causes of Taiwan’s deflation, they simply presented narrative 
explanations or arguments, without engaging in any in-depth or detailed analysis. 
In the early part of the year 2004, the CPI in Taiwan reversed its downward trend 
and started to rise.    The government and various research institutions in Taiwan also 
predicted that the CPI would rise in 2004.  Although the problem of deflation in 
Taiwan appears to no longer exist, there are several questions that are worth looking 
                                                 
1 The theme of the seminar held by the Bank of Japan (2001) was “Monetary Policy under a Low 
Inflation Rate,” in which participants mostly emphasized the importance of monetary policy during a 
period of deflation.  For example, Cargill thought that central banks generally focused more on 
policies to control the monetary environment during periods of inflation, while neglecting the 
seriousness of the problem of deflation, therefore seldom utilizing monetary policy tools to prevent the 
deflation phenomenon.  This is considered to be one of the main reasons for the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. Cargill thought that Sweden differed from the U.S. in that it laid emphasis on the price level, 
paying close attention to deflation.    As for Japan, he offered the same suggestion, calling for emphasis 
on the importance of monetary policy during a period of deflation.  Goodfriend also thought that 
monetary policy was the fundamental reason for deflation and economic stagnation.  5
into.  How serious has the deflation problem in Taiwan really been in the last few 
years?  What are the fundamental reasons for the deflation?  How has the Central 
Bank in Taiwan responded to deflation?  How effective have the Central Bank’s 
policies been?    This paper aims to answer these questions. 
Since deflation is usually accompanied by recession, Section II of this paper 
briefly introduces the changes in the political and economic environment in Taiwan 
that have taken place in recent years, thereby providing the background for Taiwan’s 
unsatisfactory economic performance since 1999.  Section III explains two 
phenomena associated with macro-price changes.  One is deflation, and the other is 
price divergence.  Price divergence refers to the phenomenon that the three 
macro-price indices, i.e. the CPI, WPI and GDP deflator (PGDP), have been moving 
in different directions.  In this section, major global factors that have affected 
Taiwan’s prices are emphasized, and the causes of the WPI-CPI divergence are also 
investigated.  Section IV sets up a simplified AD-AS model that is used to estimate 
the deterministic equation for Taiwan’s PGDP, and uses the empirical results to 
explain why the PGDP has fallen since 1999.  Section V explains how Taiwan’s 
Central Bank operates its monetary and exchange-rate policies, and then discusses its 
policy responses to deflation, while also carefully reviewing their effectiveness.    The 
final section presents the conclusions.  6
II.    The Political and Economic Environment in Recent Years 
Taiwan’s economic growth used to be regarded by foreign scholars and 
decision-makers as a “miracle” or taken as a “model” for developing countries to 
study or follow.  Due to its sound economic fundamentals, quick policy responses, 
and other reasons as mentioned in Shea and Shih (1999), Taiwan was also relatively 
immune from the attack of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, performing 
better in terms of its economic growth rate, unemployment rate, currency depreciation 
and falling stock prices than its East Asian neighbors. 
As Table 1 shows, however, Taiwan’s economic performance since 1999 has 
never returned to the illustrious growth of the past three to four decades.  The 
economic growth rate has yet to again exceed 6%, and even recorded its first negative 
growth rate of -2.18% in 2001 in Taiwan’s post-war history.    The unemployment rate 
has also climbed steadily and remained at a level of around 5% in 2003.  Although 
the stock price index and the total stock trading volume recovered a little in 2000, 
they have both decreased in other years.  The New Taiwan dollar (hereafter the NT 
dollar) has also remained weak relative to the U.S. dollar during this period. 
There have been several factors that have served to bring about Taiwan’s 
unsatisfactory economic performance since 1999.  The poor performance in 2001 
can be partly explained by a gloomy world economy caused by the bursting of the 
Internet and IT bubbles in late 2000 and the 911 terrorist attacks in  2001.  The  SARS 
epidemic also hampered Taiwan’s economic growth in 2003.  In addition to these 
two well-known factors, the deterioration in the political and economic environment 
in Taiwan is also a fundamental reason. 
Since the early 1990s, the ruling power in Taiwan has gradually shifted from  7
those who migrated from mainland China to Taiwan in the late 1940s together with 
the KMT (Kuomintang) government, to the so-called “native Taiwanese.”  During 
the process of this power transition, an ongoing confrontation between the two camps 
has never been resolved.  Although a significant proportion of the people in Taiwan 
would like to maintain Taiwan’s status quo, there is major division among the people 
on the issue of whether Taiwan should pursue independence from China or be unified 
with China at some point in the future.  Constant friction between the two camps as 
well as disputes between them in major elections, which Taiwan has held almost 
annually in recent years, have caused Taiwan to degenerate into a society that lacks 
any consensus or harmonization.    The switch in the ruling party from the KMT to the 
DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) for the first time in 2000 has only further 
complicated the situation.  KMT and DPP legislators have since then fought tooth 
and nail almost irrationally on any issue in the Legislative Yuan (the law-making body 
in Taiwan).   The result is a semi-paralyzed government without much determination 
or executive power.  This phenomenon of political unrest is certainly a negative 
factor in relation to private investment. 
The rise of China’s economy has also affected Taiwan’s own economy in many 
ways.  China’s cheap labor and land have provided Taiwan’s fading labor-intensive 
industries with an opportunity to revitalize themselves.    A big China market has also 
been attractive to capital- and technology-intensive product manufacturers.   
Therefore, huge numbers of business people flooded into China to invest in the 1990s.   
This massive investment in China gave rise to concerns over whether Taiwan’s 
economy would be “hollowed out.”    This hollowing-out concern plus the bad feeling 
regarding China on its political stance of constantly repressing Taiwan in international 
affairs finally led former President Teng-Hui Lee to adopt a “no hurry, be patient”  8
policy to guide economic relations with China.  However, due to the huge potential 
profits from investing in China and the advantage of sharing the same language and 
culture enjoyed by Taiwan businessmen in competing with investors from other 
countries, this “no hurry, be patient” policy did not effectively counter the huge-flow 
of westward-bound investment from Taiwan to China. 
After the opposition DPP candidate won the presidential election in 2000, the 
DPP’s stance of leaning toward Taiwan’s independence from China has enhanced 
China’s hostility toward Taiwan.  No official dialogue between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait has ever been resumed.  China has even strengthened its threat of 
military reprisals against Taiwan.    A large number of the DPP’s loyal supporters also 
oppose any closer economic ties with China.    Tension with China of this sort has not 
only put an end to the potential role that Taiwan can play as a medium or bridge for 
foreign investors entering the China market, but it has also discouraged private and 
direct foreign investment in Taiwan. 
  9
Table 1:    Key Economic Indicators 

















7.12 2.94  1.71  3.76  1.56  5,043  10.724 
1996 6.10  3.11  -1.01  3.08  2.60  6,004  12.908 
1997 6.68  1.68  -0.45  0.89  2.72  8,411  37.241 
1998 4.57  2.64  0.60  1.69  2.69  7,738  29.619 
1999 5.42  -1.42  -4.55  0.17  2.92  7,427  29.292 
2000 5.86  -1.73  1.82  1.26  2.99  7,847  30.527 
2001 -2.18  0.57  -1.34  -0.01  4.57  4,907  18.355 
2002 3.59  -1.01  0.05  -0.20  5.17  5,226  21.874 
2003 3.31  -2.13  2.48  -0.28  4.99  5,254  20.333 
 



































Debt as a % 
of GNP 
1991-1995 





a  14.28 2,451  18.0
a  12.36
a 
1996 27.491  0.73  11.36  4.15  3.44  3,843  16.1  16.5 
1997  32.638  0.85  12.23 4.18  18.61  5,243 15.7  17.2 
1998  32.216  0.71  9.29 4.93  11.88  3,836  16.0 15.8 
1999  31.395  0.54  6.91 5.67  -0.68  4,420  14.7 14.5 
2000  32.992  0.47  6.05 6.20  15.76  6,701  13.2 25.3 
2001  34.999  0.26  3.61 8.16 -29.29  5,480  13.0 28.9 
2002 34.753  -0.47  -7.35  6.84  2.50  4,886  12.3  29.0 
2003  33.978  0.21  3.50 5.00  -1.47  5,679  12.2 31.3 
Note: a. Figure for 1995 
Sources: Various data from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank of China. 
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Table 2:    Contribution to Economic Growth Rate of Expenditure Items
a,b 
Unit: % 
















1996 6.10  5.58 
(91.48)  3.85 0.87  0.46  0.40  0.52 
(8.52) 
1997 6.68  8.43 
(126.20)  4.30 0.75  2.48  0.90  -1.75 
(-26.20)
1998 4.57  6.38 
(139.61)  3.88 0.70  1.75  0.05  -1.81 
(-39.61)
1999 5.42  1.87 
(34.50)  3.25 -0.38  -0.11  -0.89  3.55 
(65.50) 
2000 5.86  3.89 
(66.40)  2.98 -0.28  2.36  -1.17  1.97 
(33.60) 
2001 -2.18  -4.93 
(272.02)  0.62 -0.26  -4.78  -0.51  2.75 
(-126.15)
2002 3.59  0.96 
(26.74)  1.23 -0.73  0.30  0.16  2.63 
(73.26) 
2003 3.31  0.36 
(10.88)  0.42 -0.07  -0.17  0.18  2.95 
(89.12) 
Note: a. Calculated by (real growth rate of expenditure item x share in GDP of previous year) 
b. Figures in parentheses are contribution shares to the economic growth rate of that specific year. 
c. Public expenditure includes government consumption, government investment, and public-enterprise 
investment. 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. 
 
The financial sector in Taiwan has also encountered a number of problems.  
Allowing new private banks to be set up in 1991 suddenly increased the number of 
domestic commercial banks from 17 in 1991 to 33 in 1993.  Some credit 
cooperatives and investment and trust companies were also allowed to be converted 
into commercial banks in subsequent years.    Therefore, the total number of domestic 
banks, including commercial banks and medium-business banks, increased from 25 in 
1991 to 41 in 1993 and to 52 in 1999 – more than double the original number.  The 
resulting fierce competition among banks led to credit expansion and prosperous 
stock and real estate markets in the mid-1990s.  11
In the years that followed, although Taiwan remained relatively insulated from 
the East Asian financial crisis, the contagion effects of the crisis still caused Taiwan’s 
stock and real estate prices to fall and the non-performing loans ratio of its financial 
institutions to rise in 1998.  Furthermore, between the end of 1998 and early-1999, 
several listed companies and business groups, which had been found guilty of 
misconduct in fund management (such as engaging in cross investments in the stocks 
of group members, being highly leveraged, borrowing short to invest long, being 
involved in stock-price supporting activities, or over-investing in the slackening 
housing industry), sank into heavy financial trouble.  These so-called “land-mine” 
companies or business groups not only adversely affected the financial condition of 
the domestic banks, but also accelerated the downturn in stock prices. 
Fierce competition among banks together with the accidents caused by these 
“land-mine” companies steadily lowered the return on assets (ROA) and the return on 
equity (ROE) of domestic banks, and raised the non-performing loans ratios of 
financial institutions during the 1998-2002 period, as Table 1 indicates.  The 
willingness and ability of financial institutions to grant loans to the business sector, 
especially those invested in China, therefore shrank during this same period. 
All of the above-mentioned factors including political unrest, tensions with 
China, out-bound investments attracted by China, and a weakened financial sector, 
had a detrimental impact on private and foreign investment in Taiwan.    As shown in 
Table 1, the growth of fixed investment on the part of private enterprises slowed down 
or even turned negative, while direct investment abroad grew significantly after 1999. 
When faced with a deflationary situation, a government is usually expected to 
adopt an expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate the economy.  Unfortunately, 
Taiwan’s government has been constrained by its deteriorating financial condition,  12
such that it has not been able to afford to expand public expenditure.    Under China’s 
threat of military action, Taiwan has had no room to cut its national defense 
expenditure.  Moreover, political parties have been competing for votes by writing 
checks for welfare programs, cutting tax rates, and by providing tax holidays or tax 
exemptions to please the voters.  As a result, the tax burden in Taiwan, as Table 1 
shows, has fallen year after year to reach a level of 12.2% in 2003, one of the lowest 
in the world.  The outstanding central government debts as a percentage of GNP 
have also been increasing very rapidly from 14.5% in 1999 to 31.3% in 2003. 
Due to such financial constraints, Taiwan’s public expenditure including 
government consumption, government investment, and public-enterprise investment 
in fact fell during 1999-2003, bringing a negative contribution to economic growth in 
this period, as Table 2 shows.  We can also see from this table that the private 
sector’s fixed investment in addition contributed little or even negatively to economic 
growth, except in the year 2000.  Another conclusion we can draw from Table 2 is 
that the major driving force behind economic growth on the expenditure side during 
the period 1999-2003 was net exports instead of domestic demand. 
  13
III.  Macro-price  Changes  in  Taiwan 
1.    Deflation as a New but Short-term Concern 
In April 2003, Taiwan was listed by the IMF as a country that faced a high risk of 
deflation, along with Japan, Hong Kong, and Germany.  The IMF calculated the 
deflation risk index for 35 countries, and classified the results into four categories as 
high-, medium-, low-, and very low-risk countries.    Among the countries categorized 









































































































Figure 1 depicts the growth rate of Taiwan’s GDP deflator (hereafter PGDP) 
from 1961 to 2003.  Except for 1965 when its value was negative (-0.61 %), the 
                                                 
2  See Kumar (2003) and Rogoff (2003).  14
PGDP annual growth rates before 1998 were positive.  During this period of the 
PGDP’s growth, the annual growth rate seldom exceeded 5 percent, except for the two 
oil crisis years.  However, there has been an obvious change since 1999.  That is, 
PGDP growth turned negative in most of the subsequent years.  The annual PGDP 
growth rate was -1.42 percent in 1999, -1.73 percent in 2000, 0.57 percent in 2001, 
-1.01 percent in 2002, and -2.13 percent  in  2003.  The  CPI  also exhibited a negative 
growth rate for three consecutive years in 2001-2003, as Table 1 indicates.    The IMF 
and scholars in Taiwan thus worried that Taiwan might have started to experience 
deflation.
3 
Since 2003, however, the global as well as domestic economic situation has 
improved.  Starting with the second half of the year 2003, the global prices of raw 
materials like steel, cement, petroleum, coal, wheat, soybeans, butter, and paper pulp 
have been surging.    During the first quarter of 2004, the CPI in Taiwan increased by 
0.51 percent as compared with the same quarter in 2003.    During that same time, the 
core CPI rose by 0.12 percent and the WPI increased by 2.37 percent.  The 
government and various research institutions in Taiwan have each forecast that both 
the CPI and WPI will exhibit positive growth rates in 2004.    The period of deflation 
is therefore generally believed to be over. 
2. Global Factors Affecting Taiwan Prices 
Taiwan is a highly open economy.  Since the 1970s, the ratios of exports and 
imports to GDP have almost always remained above 40 percent, sometimes even 
exceeding 50 percent.    The macro economy of Taiwan has thus been deeply affected 
by the global economic situation  and prices.  For example, during the periods of the 
                                                 
3  Deflation is defined as a phenomenon where general price levels continue to drop.    To facilitate the 
analysis, the International Monetary Fund defines deflation as occurring when annual price growth is 
negative for two consecutive years. Please see IMF (1999), p. 106.  15
two oil crises, Taiwan encountered the problem of so-called “imported inflation”.  
Macro-price changes in Taiwan in recent years have not only been caused by domestic 
factors, but have also been closely related to two factors that have affected global 
prices — the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2000 and the rise of China’s economy. 
Excessively optimistic expectations on the future of the Internet, 
communications, and the IT industries resulted in over-investment and caused stock 
prices to soar in the late-1990s.    After the economic bubble burst at the end of 2000, 
the huge excess capacities of these industries led to their prices dropping.  The 
bursting of the bubble also caused stock prices to sink and wealth to shrink.  
Furthermore, the global economic situation worsened and unemployment rose.  All 
of these factors caused world consumption to fall.  In addition, excess capacity 
contributed to a pessimistic outlook, so that willingness to invest decreased.  
Therefore, the bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles brought about a weakening in 
world consumption and investment, which further caused global prices to fall. 
Ever since China accelerated its transition from a controlled economy to a 
market economy in 1992, and reinforced its trade and investment relations with the 
rest of the world, it has had a significant impact on the global economy.    The rise of 
China’s economy has affected global and Taiwanese prices in several ways. 
China has a huge pool of cheap labor.  Labor-intensive products produced in 
China and exported to the world market have forced the global prices of those 
products, mostly final consumer goods, to fall.   On the other hand, the rise of China 
has caused the prices of China’s major imports, mostly raw materials, agricultural 
products, and capital- or technology-intensive goods (regarding which China has a 
comparative disadvantage) to rise.  China’s rapid economic development has also 
raised the purchasing power and hence private consumption of the Chinese people,  16
which has further increased the demand for and the global prices of raw materials and 
agricultural products.  To prepare for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the 
2010 Shanghai World Exposition, China has begun large-scale public construction 
projects, which have given rise to even higher increases in the global prices of raw 
materials such as minerals, cement, and petroleum.
4 
In sum, due to the rise of China’s economy, the global prices of China’s exports 
(most are manufactured as final consumer goods) are decreasing, while the prices of 
China’s imports (mainly upstream raw materials, intermediate, and agricultural 
products, and machinery and equipment) are rising.    However, because China enjoys 
a huge trade surplus, the price decreases have outweighed the increases.  Therefore, 
global prices are on average falling, which represents deflation.   
China’s renminbi is pegged to the U.S. dollar.  While its balance of payments 
has recorded a surplus for years and the U.S. dollar has been depreciating, China has 
still not allowed the renminbi to appreciate.    The undervaluation of the renminbi has 
not only reinforced China’s export competitiveness, but has also enhanced the 
pressure of global deflation.  In the last two years, world leaders and economists 
have often charged that China’s cheap exports have interrupted the global price 
structure.    China’s “so-called” manipulation of the renminbi exchange rate (which is 
in fact fixed, just like that of the HK dollar) has become a target of criticism and 
discussion. 
                                                 
4 China consumed approximately 50 percent of the world’s cement, 36 percent of its steel products, 
and 30 percent of its coal in 2003.  In 2003, China’s demand for steel products amounted to about 
38,000,000 tons.    In the first quarter of 2004, China imported 10,080,000 tons of steel products worth 
US$5.72 billion.  The quantity of steel products imported increased by 17.5 percent compared with 
the first quarter of 2003, with the total value going up by 28.4 percent.  In 2003, China imported 
91,120,000 tons of crude oil (representing annual growth of 30 percent).   In the first quarter of 2004, 
China imported 30,140,000 tons of crude oil worth US$7.15 billion.    The volume of crude oil imports 
increased by 35.7 percent compared with the first quarter of 2003 and its total value by 41.2 percent.  
This shows that unit prices for steel products and crude oil have surged.  17
3.    Divergence of PGDP, CPI, and WPI 
In recent years, the macro-price indices in Taiwan have exhibited a divergence, 
appearing that the PGDP, CPI, and WPI have been moving in different directions.
5  
As Figure 2 indicates, from 1999 to 2000, the PGDP declined, but the WPI and CPI 
rose slightly. In addition, from 2002 to 2003, both the PGDP and CPI declined, 
leading to a concern about deflation.  The WPI, however, rose — an obvious price 
divergence. 
 
































In fact, price divergence happens all the time in Taiwan.  As can be seen from 
Table 3 and Figure 3, since 1982, price divergence has occurred many times, of which 
the most obvious occurred in 1985-1987, 1992, 2000, and 2003.    For example, from 
1985 to 1992, the CPI and PGDP went up, while the WPI went down. 
                                                 
5 When there is price divergence, which price index is a proper indicator for inflation or deflation 
becomes the issue.  18
 
Table 3:    Moving Directions of WPI, CPI, and PGDP (1982 to 2003) 






































































Divergence  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
From 1982 to 2003, only five years have experienced a simultaneous movement in the same direction for three price indices. 
Note: 1: ‘+’ means positive growth, ‘-’ means negative growth. 
          2: ‘Yes’ means a simultaneous movement in the same direction for the three price indices. ‘No’   
means no such co-movement.   
 



















































4.  Causes  of  WPI-CPI  Divergence 
This subsection intends to explain the possible factors that caused a divergence 
between the WPI and CPI during the period extending from the fourth quarter of 2002 
to the third quarter of 2003.  During this period, the CPI slowly declined, while the 
WPI rose. 
What the WPI measures is the factory price or wholesale price of three categories  19
of products: domestically-produced and domestically-sold (DPDS) products, imported 
goods, and exported goods.    It is a weighted average of the above three categories of 
price indices.  Let WPId, PM, and PX represent the price index of DPDS products, 
the import price index, and the export price index, respectively.  These three 
components enjoy roughly equal weights in the current calculation of the WPI in 
Taiwan. 
As Figure 4 shows, the WPId in Taiwan fell during 1998 and 1999, began to rise 
slightly in 2000, to be followed by a further slight decline in 2001.  Since then, the 
WPId has been rising.  The reason why the WPId fell in 2001 was the recession in 
Taiwan.  A lack of effective domestic demand caused the WPId to slide.  Since 
2003, the economy has slightly recovered. Domestic demand and the WPId are 
therefore rising. 
In the case of import prices (PM), because agricultural and industrial raw 
materials constitute the largest portion of Taiwan’s imports, followed by capital goods 
and consumer goods, PM is mainly affected by the global prices of agricultural and 
industrial raw materials as well as capital goods.  It is also influenced by the global 
prices of consumer goods, the NT dollar exchange rate, and customs duties.   
Since the 1980s, the effective customs duty rate has decreased, resulting in 
decreasing import prices.  Since 2001, however, the NT dollar has depreciated, 
pushing up import prices.  Strong Chinese demand for raw materials and capital 
goods has caused the global prices of that category of goods to soar, thus raising 
Taiwan’s import prices and hence the WPI since the fourth quarter of 2002. 
As for export prices (PX), Taiwan’s exports are mainly composed of industrial 
products, the bulk of which are information industry and electrical machinery or  20
electronics products.  The former has been affected by the bursting of the Internet 
bubble, and the latter by competition from China’s exports in recent years.  The PX 
has thus dropped since the second half of 2002. 
Figure 4 summarizes the trend in the WPI and its components since 1998.  
During the period from the fourth quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2003, the 
WPI rose.  Among its components, the wholesale price index for DPDS products 
(WPId) rose as well as the import price index (PM), while the export price index (PX) 
declined.  Therefore, it is evident that the rise in the WPI was mainly caused by a 
rise in the prices of DPDS products and imported goods. 
   21
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CPI trends have differed from those of the WPI.  From the fourth quarter of 
2002 to the third quarter of 2003, the WPI surged, while the CPI fell.  The CPI 
measures the retail prices of consumer goods and services.  Consumer goods can be 
further divided into local consumer goods and imported consumer goods.    Let PGDP 
be a proxy measure of the prices of local consumer goods, and PMc and Ps the prices 
of imported consumer goods and services, respectively.  The CPI is then roughly a 
weighted average of PGDP, PMc, and Ps.  The changes in CPI, PGDP, PMC, and Ps 
are presented in Figure 5.    This figure shows that the CPI’s decrease since 2001 was 
closely related to the fall in PGDP and Ps. 
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Figure 7: Growth Rate of Interest Rate












































































































































































Because the fall in the price of services (Ps) is a major factor causing the CPI to 
drop, we study the reasons for the decrease in Ps.    The production costs and prices of 
services are mainly determined by the wage (W), rent (R), and the interest rate (r).  
Figures 6 and 7 indicate that Ps moves closely with rent R and the interest rate r.  
The wage has also been relatively stable since 2001. 
Falling rents were mainly caused by factors such as weak domestic demand, the 
outward migration of companies and white-collar laborers, and an oversupply of 
houses and office buildings.  The decline in the interest rate was due to the central 
banks of many countries adopting a low-interest-rate policy to stimulate their 
economies during this period, a path that Taiwan also followed.  Stable wages were 
the result of competition from Chinese labor and an increase in domestic 
unemployment. 
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IV:    Analysis of Deflation Based on the GDP Deflator 
1.  Theoretical  Model  of  PGDP  Determination 
The GDP Deflator (PGDP) measures the price of final domestic products.  
According to the aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply (AD-AS) model, any 
factors that may cause the AD curve to move to the right (left) will lead PGDP to go 
up (down), while it may cause the AS curve to shift to the right (left), leading PGDP 
to go down (up). 
The aggregate demand function AD which is derived from the IS-LM analysis 
can be presented as follows: 
              -       +    +    +   +   +  
(1)  YꇗAD (PGDP; GEXP, MS, Pf, Yf, EXR,…). 
In this equation, Y is real GDP; GEXP is government real expenditures, 
including government consumption expenditures, government investment, and public 
enterprise investment; MS is money-supply volume; Pf and Yf represent foreign 
prices and the global economic situation, respectively; and EXR is the exchange rate 
measuring the value of the U.S. dollar in terms of the NT dollar.  On the right-hand 
side of the equation, a positive or negative symbol above each explanatory variable 
represents the direction of the impact of that variable on Y.    To simplify the analysis, 
the AD equation omits certain explanatory variables that cannot be precisely measured 
in the empirical study, such as expectations regarding the future economic situation, 
or real wealth, etc. 
A general equation of aggregate-supply AS can be presented as follows: 
             +     -   +   +  
(2)  YꇗAS (PGDP; W, K, T).  27
In this equation, W is the nominal wage rate; K is the capital stock; and T is the 
technology level.  Because it is difficult to measure the capital stock K and 
technology level T, and W, K, and T may jointly affect aggregate supply through unit 
output labor cost LC, the aggregate-supply function can be rewritten as   
          +     -  
(3)  YꇗAS* (PGDP; LC).
6 
From equations 1 and 3, the PGDP equation can be derived as   
               +     +    +     +   +   +  
(4)  PGDPꇗf (GEXP, MS, EXR, Pf, Yf, LC,…). 
Because increases in the first five explanatory variables on the right-hand side all 
cause the AD curve to shift to the right, while a rise in LC causes the AS curve to shift 
to the left, six explanatory variables have a positive impact on PGDP. 
2.  Empirical  Analyses 
The sources of the relevant variables used to conduct an empirical estimation of 
equation 4 are summarized in Table 4.  Because the United States and China are 
Taiwan’s most important export markets, this study adopts the real value of imports 
of the United States (Yfus) and China (Yfc) as representative variables for the global 
economic situation (Yf) that affects Taiwan’s PGDP.  The data period adopted 
extends from the first quarter of 1982 to the second quarter of 2003. 
 
                                                 
6  In theory, it is not difficult to infer that the impact of the wage rate W on unit output labor cost LC is 
positive, and the impact of the capital stock K and the technology level T on LC is negative.  
Furthermore, because LC affects aggregate supply negatively, Equation 3 implies that the impact of W 
on Y is negative, and the impact of K and T on Y is positive, which is consistent with Equation 2.  28
Table  4:  Explanation  of  Variables 
Variable Definition  Source 
PGDP  GDP deflator  Compiled from data on the website 
of the Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, ROC. 
GEXP  Total real expenditure of the 
government 
1.  Government consumption 
expenditure is from the database 
of the Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC.
2.  Government investment and 
public enterprise investment are 
from the table of Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation, Monthly 
Bulletin of Statistics. 
3.  Real Government Expenditure is 
deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Pf  World export price index  IFS 
Yfus  Real US import value = Total 
US import value / US import 
price *100 
IFS 
Yfc  Real China import value = 




LC  Index of unit output labor cost 
for industry 
Database of the Directorate-General 
of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC. 
MS  M2 daily average  Central Bank of China website. 
EXR  Exchange Rate (NT$/US$)  Central Bank of China website. 
In this empirical study, all economic variables are used in logarithmic form.  
Since there is much evidence that many macro-variables are non-stationary, this study 
first uses Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to examine the existence of unit roots before 
conducting a regression analysis.  As the results summarized in Table 5 show, there 
exists a unit root for all the variables in logarithmic form, and the first differences of 
these variables do not possess unit roots.  In other words, these variables should be 
differenced once to obtain stationarity. 
 
                                                 
7  Since the data on China’s import price index are not obtainable, this paper adopts the CPI as a 
substitute variable.    29
 
Table  5:  Stationarity  and  Unit-Root  Tests
Variables Level First Difference
LPGDP  -0.468† -3.994** 
LGEXP  -1.973† -4.725*** 
LPf  -1.497  -7.297*** 
Lyfus  -2.703  -3.736** 
Lyfc  -1.996  -5.254*** 
LLC  0.014  -4.749*** 
LMS  0.444  -3.449* 
LEXR  -1.055  -6.053*** 
Note: All variables are calculated in log-form. 
This table uses Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level, and *** 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Our PGDP equation is derived from a simplified AD-AS model. Some of the 
explanatory variables in the equation, such as MS, LC and EXR, should be 
endogenous variables in a complete macro-system. To circumvent the 
simultaneous-equation bias problem, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique is 
adopted to estimate the PGDP equation. The last two-period values of the endogenous 
variables MS, LC, and EXR are included as instrumental variables in the 2SLS 
estimation.
8    The results are reported in Table 6.    From Table 6, we can deduce that 
variables LGEXP, LMS, LEXR, LYfus, LYfc and LLC all exert a significantly 
positive impact on PGDP, while the respective impacts of LPf is are positive, though 
not significant.  Regarding the signs of the regression coefficients, they all conform 




                                                 
8  We also adopt the OLS technique to verify our model.    The results are consistent with those of the  30
Table 6:    Regression Results for PGDP Using 2SLS 








































Noteꅇ1. All variables are calculated using logs and first differences (not including the constant C and seasonal 
dummy variables D2, D3, and D4). 
2. Since economic interaction between Taiwan and China began in 1991, variable D(LYc) is set at 0 before 
1990. 
3. The figures in parentheses are t-values, where * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** 
significance at the 5 percent level, and *** significance at the 1 percent level (one-tail test).   
4. List of instruments: D(LLC(-1)), D(LLC(-2)), D(LMS(-1)), D(LMS(-2)), D(LEXR(-1)), D(LEXR(-2)), 
D(LGEXP), D(LPf), D(LYfus), D(LYfc), D2, D3, D4. 
 
The 2SLS results therefore show that, for domestic factors, government 
expenditures, unit output labor cost, money supply, and the NT exchange rate all have 
                                                                                                                                            
2SLS technique.  31
a significantly positive impact on Taiwan’s PGDP.  It is clear that fiscal, monetary, 
and exchange rate policies do matter in affecting PGDP. 
With respect to global factors, China’s economic situation (applying China’s total 
real import value) and the U.S. economic situation (applying the total real value of 
U.S. imports) have a significantly positive impact on Taiwan’s PGDP, while foreign 
prices (adopting global export prices) tend to have a positive impact, although it is not 
significant.  It is worth noting that the coefficient of China’s import value is 
significant, thus showing the importance of the China factor. 
Based on the regression results, we can identify the sources of PGDP deflation in 
Taiwan.  Since 1999, PGDP has been declining except in 2001.  This phenomenon 
of a declining PGDP has been caused by several factors.    Figure 8 shows the changes 
in the three most significant explanatory variables (GEXP, LC, EXR), together with 
that of world export prices Pf.  As explained in Section II, mainly due to a finance 
constraint, government expenditures decreased during this period.  Furthermore, 
improvements in production technology caused unit output labor costs to go down 
except in 2001.  The bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles and the rise of China’s 
economy also depressed world export prices before 2003.  Furthermore, the NT 
dollar appreciated relative to the U.S. dollar in 1999 and 2000.  All of these factors 
contributed to PGDP’s decline. 
In addition to the explanatory variables incorporated in the model, other factors, 
such as the shrinkage of wealth due to the falling stock and real estate prices, political 
instability, and increased tensions with China, should also have had a negative impact 
on Taiwan’s GDP and PGDP.    This study, however, does not include these factors in 
the empirical analysis for reasons of simplicity and a lack of appropriate data. 
   32
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V.    The Central Bank’s Policy Responses to Deflation 
Although the Central Bank in Taiwan (formally the Central Bank of China, 
hereafter the CBC) has never admitted that Taiwan has encountered the problem of 
deflation, the CBC implemented some measures to stimulate aggregate demand for 
Taiwan’s products, in order to promote the economic growth rate as well as counter 
the problem of deflation.
9  The deterioration in the government’s financial situation 
as explained in Section II restricted the government’s ability to adopt an expansionary 
fiscal policy to promote the economy.  The CBC’s monetary and exchange rate 
policies therefore became the major policy instruments for the government to rely on. 
1.  The Formation of Monetary Policy   
According to the Central Bank Act, the CBC has the obligation to maintain price 
as well as exchange rate stability and to assist in economic development.    To achieve 
these final goals, the CBC chooses monetary-aggregate targeting as the basic 
framework of its monetary policy, instead of inflation, exchange-rate, or interest-rate 
targeting.  Since 1992, the monetary aggregate M2 has been chosen as the 
intermediate target of monetary policy to achieve the final goals. 
Before the end of each year, the CBC (often after having consulted with scholars 
and experts) sets and publicly announces the target zone of the M2 growth rate for the 
subsequent year based on the government’s target figures of the economic growth rate 
and inflation rate, as well as other factors influencing the demand for money such as 
the opportunity cost of holding money and the diversification of financial assets.  
Using a zone, rather than a specific number, as the M2 growth target, the CBC is 
endowed with the flexibility to maintain the stability of interest rates, the exchange 
                                                 
9  When deflation became a public concern in Taiwan in 2002 and 2003, the CBC several times tried to 
downplay the issue by pointing out either that the core CPI was still rising or that the falling CPI was 
just a temporary phenomenon.  34
rate, and other major financial indicators in the year. 
The actual M2 growth rate is very carefully observed each month by the CBC.  
In order to effectively control M2, the CBC adopts reserve money as the operational 
target.  At the beginning of each month, the CBC has a monetary estimation and 
forecasting meeting to determine the target value of reserve money for that month.  
A reference target for the inter-bank overnight call-loan rate is also derived in the 
meeting.  The CBC then applies a variety of operational instruments, including 
required reserves, discounts and accommodations, open-market operations, 
re-deposits from financial institutions, selective credit management, and moral 
suasion, to fine-tune the daily figures of reserve money and the inter-bank overnight 
call-loan  rate.   
Among these operational instruments, open-market operations are the most 
frequently-used  instruments.  Re-deposits  from financial instruments, selective credit 
management, and adjusting the discount and accommodation rates are sometimes 
adopted.  The  required  reserve ratios are adjusted only occasionally for special cases 
as a strong monetary policy measure.  For open-market operations, the CBC before 
1992 relied on the issuance of savings bonds, treasury bills, and certificates of deposit 
(CDs) as tools to manage the liquidity situation in the financial market.  However, 
the issuance of savings bonds and treasury bills was terminated in 1992 and 1998, 
respectively.  In recent years, the CBC has either issued or redeemed CDs almost 
every day to affect the liquidity and inter-bank overnight call-loan rate.    Since 1999, 
the CBC has depended heavily on the issuance of CDs and on receiving re-deposits 
from financial institutions in order to sterilize the impact of the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves on reserve money, such that the CBC’s outstanding CDs 
and re-deposits from financial institutions have increased very rapidly.  The 
outstanding CDs had even reached NT$2.99 trillion, equivalent to 185% of total  35
reserve money; and re-deposits from financial institutions amounted to NT$2.06 
trillion, or 127% of reserve money, as of the end of 2003.
10 
2.  Exchange Rate Policy 
The authorities in Taiwan shifted from a fixed exchange rate system to a floating 
exchange rate system in July 1978.  The purpose behind introducing a floating 
exchange rate was to make Taiwan’s economy less vulnerable to external disturbances.   
However, in a highly open economy like Taiwan, the exchange rate is a key factor 
affecting its trade balance, economic growth, and domestic price level.  The 
exchange rate is therefore frequently regarded as an important policy instrument to 
promote economic growth or stabilize prices.  According to the Central Bank Act, 
the CBC also has the obligation to stabilize the external value of the NT dollar, i.e. the 
exchange rate.  Hence, since the adoption of a floating exchange rate in 1978, the 
CBC has frequently intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to affect the 
level of the exchange rate or its fluctuations. The final purpose of the CBC is either to 
promote exports and economic growth, to stabilize domestic prices, or to stabilize the 
exchange rate.  In other words, what is adopted by the CBC is in fact a managed 
floating exchange rate. 
The general impression and feeling derived by scholars and experts in Taiwan 
from the CBC’s foreign exchange operations may be summed up as follows.  First, 
the CBC has usually adopted a strategy of repressing the NT dollar, aiming to 
promote exports. Therefore, the NT dollar has been characterized as being “easy to 
depreciate, difficult to appreciate.” Second, when domestic prices face any serious 
                                                 
10  Re-deposits from financial institutions constitute a very powerful and effective operational 
instrument for the CBC to adjust reserve money.    The CBC is entitled to receive or return re-deposits 
from the postal savings system, three specialized agricultural banks, and other approved banks when 
the CBC concludes that the domestic financial situation requires it to do so.    To increase (decrease) 
reserve money, the CBC can simply return (receive) re-deposits to (from) the financial instiutions.  36
inflation problem, the CBC is then more willing to allow the NT dollar to appreciate.   
Third, when major events such as political unrest, a military threat from China, and 
the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 occurred, so that the NT dollar faced 
serious pressure to depreciate, the CBC was obliged to defend the exchange rate. 
Since the CBC has kept information on foreign exchange intervention a secret, 
the impact of CBC’s intervention on the exchange rate is difficult to estimate.  In a 
recent study on the NT dollar exchange rate, Yang and Shea (2005) set up an optimal 
intervention model to introduce three variables, representing three purposes of CBC 
intervention, into the determination equation of the NT dollar exchange rate, together 
with the standard factors affecting the exchange rate, such as the relative price level, 
interest-rate gap, and export-competing countries’ exchange rates.  The empirical 
estimation results of this paper show that each of the three intervention-purpose 
variables played a significant role in the determination of the NT dollar exchange rate.   
The model incorporating the intervention-purpose variables performed far better, in 
terms of both explanatory power and forecasting power, than the model that excluded 
the intervention-purpose variables.  These results clearly indicate that CBC’s 
intervention is really a key factor affecting the NT dollar exchange rate, and that 
promoting economic growth, stabilizing domestic prices, and stabilizing the exchange 
rate are truly the main concerns of the CBC in exchange rate management. 
3.  Counter-Deflation Policies 
By coping with the weakening demand for money caused by the slowdown of 
economic growth and the increase of substituting financial assets, the CBC gradually 
adjusted downward the target zone of its M2 growth rate during the period from 1999 
and 2003, as shown in Figure 9.    This figure also shows that the actual growth rate of 
M2 fell most of the time into the target zone, which indicates that the CBC’s  37




The expansionary monetary policy adopted by the CBC to stimulate domestic 
demand was revealed by the policy measures, which were intended to loosen the 
monetary environment and to guide the market interest rate in a downward direction.  
Between December 2000 and the end of 2003, the CBC lowered both the discount rate 
and the rate on accommodations on 15 occasions, as indicated by Table 7.  In 
2001-2003, the required reserve ratios of the NT dollar deposits and foreign currency 
deposits were reduced on one and three occasions, respectively.  As a result, the 
market interest rates as represented by the inter-bank overnight call-loan rate, 1-year 
time deposit rate, and the 31-90 day CP rate in the secondary market all moved 
downward in 2001-2003 as Figure 10 shows. 
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Table 7:    CBC Interest Rates 
Unit: % per annum 




27 June 2000  4.750  5.125  9.625 
29 Dec. 2000  4.625  5.000  9.625 
2 Feb. 2001  4.375  4.750  9.625 
6 Mar. 2001  4.250  4.625  9.625 
30 Mar. 2001  4.125  4.500  9.625 
23 Apr. 2001  4.000  4.375  9.625 
18 May 2001  3.750  4.125  6.000 
29 June 2001  3.500  3.875  5.750 
20 Aug. 2001  3.250  3.625  5.500 
19 Sep. 2001  2.750  3.125  5.000 
4 Oct. 2001  2.500  2.875  4.750 
8 Nov. 2001  2.250  2.625  4.500 
28 Dec. 2001  2.125  2.500  4.375 
28 Jun. 2002  1.875  2.250  4.125 
12 Nov. 2002  1.625  2.000  3.875 
27 Jun. 2003  1.375  1.750  3.625 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, Republic of China, The Central 
Bank of China.  39
 
 
As for its exchange rate policy, the CBC has been used to keeping the NT dollar 
undervalued in ordinary times in order to stimulate Taiwan’s exports and economic 
growth, as explained above.  When faced with a slowdown in economic growth in 
the period 2000-2003, the CBC was naturally more eager to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market than in any ordinary period by purchasing foreign exchange in the 
market to maintain an undervalued NT dollar or to prevent it from appreciating.  
Deflation in this period further strengthened the justification for the CBC’s foreign 
exchange intervention.  Without its intervention, the currency’s appreciation would 
have caused domestic prices to go down, thereby worsening the deflation problem.  
Therefore, the CBC’s foreign exchange intervention during this period was regarded 
as a good strategy for “killing two birds with one stone.”  That is, an undervalued 
NT dollar was believed to be beneficial both in promoting economic growth and in 
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combating deflation. 
The CBC intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market to slow down the 
appreciation of the NT dollar during the period 2000-2003 when Taiwan enjoyed a 
huge balance-of-payments surplus.  The result was a rapid piling up of foreign 
exchange reserves and a relatively stable NT dollar exchange rate.  The foreign 
exchange reserves held by the CBC almost doubled from US$106.7 billion at the end 
of the year 2000 to US$206.6 billion at the end of 2003.  The NT$/US$ exchange 
rate even fell from 32.992 to 33.978, a depreciation of 2.90% relative to the U.S. 
dollar, during the same period
11. 
The by-product of foreign-exchange purchasing by the CBC was a pumping out 
of reserve money into the financial  market.  To control the growth of M2 within the 
target zone, the CBC was obligated to issue CDs and to receive re-deposits from 
financial institutions so as to sterilize the impact of foreign exchange intervention on 
reserve money.  The CBC’s outstanding CDs hence rapidly increased from NT$562 
billion at the end of the year 2000 to NT$2,992 billion at the end of 2003, and 
re-deposits from financial institutions nearly doubled from NT$1,148 billion to 
NT$2,056 billion over the same three-year period. 
Despite these efforts, the CBC’s effectiveness in curbing deflation and 
stimulating economic growth might have been limited for several reasons.  First, 
political unrest and tensions with China had not been eased, and these were major 
factors weakening private consumption and domestic investment in Taiwan.    Second, 
in view of its high degree of openness, Taiwan’s economic performance was closely 
                                                 
11 During the same period from the end of the year 2000 to the end of 2003, the appreciation rates of 
the currencies of Taiwan’s major export-competing countries relative to the U.S. dollar were as follows: 
 
Japan  South Korea  Hong Kong  Singapore  Malaysia 
7.01% 6.04% 0.51% 1.76%  0 
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linked with that of the global economy.    Taiwan could hardly curb deflation based on 
her own efforts.  Third, due to the restrictions imposed by a deteriorating 
government financial situation, an expansionary fiscal policy could not be 
implemented.  By depending on the CBC’s policies alone, the Taiwan economy 
could not have improved very much.  However, we may state that CBC’s efforts 
might have at least shielded the Taiwan economy from a more serious recession and 
deflation in 2000-2003.  42
VI.  Conclusion 
Taiwan is a small open economy that is characterized by an export-oriented path 
of development.  Domestic investment also serves to stimulate the growth of the 
economy.    In recent years, following the rising tide of local political unrest, tensions 
across the Taiwan Strait, tremendous outward investment to mainland China, and a 
global recession, Taiwan has also fallen into the trap of deflation. 
There have been some major changes in the political and economic environment 
in Taiwan in recent years.  These changes – including political unrest, tensions with 
China, outbound investment to China, a weakened financial system, and a 
deteriorating government financial situation – have provided the backdrop for an 
economic slowdown and deflation in Taiwan.  Some global factors, especially the 
bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles in late 2000 and the rise of China’s economy, 
have heavily influenced both global and Taiwanese prices. 
This paper adopts a simplified aggregate demand and aggregate supply (AD-AS) 
model, and applies quarterly data for the period from 1982 to 2003 to estimate the 
deterministic equation of the GDP deflator using 2SLS.  The empirical results 
comply with the theoretical model.  The aggregate-demand factors, both domestic 
and foreign, and the aggregate-supply factor represented by the unit output labor cost 
mostly have a significant impact on deflation. 
Based on the regression results, the sources of the decline in the GDP deflator 
since 1999 are identified.    During this period, government expenditures are observed 
to have decreased.  In addition, the development of production technology that has 
caused the unit output labor cost to fall, the collapse of the bubble economy, the influx 
of cheap products from China into the world market, and the NT dollar’s appreciation  43
have all contributed to a lower PGDP. 
In order to fight deflation, the Central Bank adopted several measures to reduce 
the extent of price decreases.  It lowered the discount rate and the rate on 
accommodations on many occasions, and occasionally reduced the required reserve 
ratio to guide the market interest rates in a downward direction.  The Central Bank 
also intervened in the foreign exchange market to maintain an undervalued NT dollar, 
so as to promote exports and combat deflation at the same time. 
Although the Central Bank tried to help solve the deflation problem, its monetary 
policy could not serve as the only remedy.  Various factors still needed to be added 
to strengthen the recession situation. Therefore, the expansionary effects of a loose 
monetary environment do not seem to be significant.  Fortunately, since 2004, the 
Taiwan economy is no longer under the threat of deflation.   
During this period of deflation, the price configuration has incurred a change, 
where the PGDP has gone down and the CPI has slightly decreased, but the WPI has 
gone up.  In fact, this kind of price divergence phenomenon has not only appeared 
during the period of deflation, but has appeared repeatedly on several occasions 
according to historical data over the years. 
In analyzing the reasons why the WPI and CPI trends have diverged since 2002, 
we find that the WPI increase is mainly due to the huge Chinese demand for raw 
materials.  This has caused the prices of global raw materials and Taiwan’s imports 
to rise, which has further caused the WPI to rise.    Another reason is that the domestic 
economy has been recovering since 2003.    As for the CPI decrease, this has resulted 
from a decrease in the prices of services and PGDP.  A decrease in the prices of 
services is related to the decline in rents and the interest rate.  A rise in domestic  44
unemployment and competition from China’s cheap labor has also kept domestic 
wages steady. 
This study has used regression analysis to analyze the decline in the PGDP.  
However, there are many domestic and foreign factors that affect prices.    This study 
is incomplete in that it has left out certain variables, such as wealth, expectations of 
the future economic situation, industry outflows, and the impact of political factors.  
Further studies could focus on overcoming these shortcomings.  45
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